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Auditing Employee Ownership in a Neo-Liberal World
Abstract:
Employee ownership has attracted much attention across the globe. Whether affected
by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), or not, this paper invokes a serious audit of
empirical findings and cross-cultural approaches to an ideologically-sensitive agenda.
Purpose: To canvass what is known about employee ownership in Neo-liberal
political economies.
Design/methodology/approach: Literature review, cross cultural analysis and
critique.
Findings: Indicate future research directions.
Research limitations/implications: Reconsideration of organizational configurations
for possible greater application in the future.
Practical implications: Public policy imperatives.
Social implications: Re-regulation of neo-liberal markets
Originality/value: Knowledge/policy transfer.
Category: Literature Review
Key Words: Employee Ownership; Stock Ownership; ESOPs; Share structures;
Management incentives/philosophies.
2Introduction: Employee Share (stock) Ownership
Employee ownership is currently attracting considerable attention in the press across
the globe. For example, in February 2008, there were 1,436 press articles published,
of which 683 focused on stock options, whilst 212 focused on workers' cooperatives
(EFESO, 2008). There have also been a growing number of academic articles in the
last few years, particularly in the U.S., where Employee Stock Ownership (ESO) or
rather Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) diversification is an issue of concern.
Such interest has been stimulated in part by the governments in North America, Europe,
Australia and Asia promoting various forms of employee share ownership through a
variety of schemes which, in turn, have resulted in considerable differences in the practice
of employee participation between countries. Thus making generalizations about
employee share ownership has to be done with considerable caution.
Furthermore, employee ownership terminology usage in the literature is not always
clear and, at times, is confusing as articles refer to ‘employee stock ownership;’
‘employee’s financial participation; ‘profit sharing;’ ‘sharing ownership;’ and
‘employee ownership’. Equally, what exactly constitutes an ESOP varies. A narrow
definition is one where at least one employee receiving payment from an ESOP deems
the firm as an employee stock ownership (ESO) employing company (Sengupta et al,
2007). A less restricted definition requires that a majority of non-managerial employees
participate in the scheme for the company to be considered ESO employing (Robinson
and Zhang, 2005). A broad-based definition theoretically covers the entire workforce.
However, as most schemes never have 100 per cent coverage at any given time, since
participation in the scheme calls for a minimum employment period, in practice, an ESO
company is considered as such if a minimum of 50 per cent of the employees are
covered by an ESO scheme (Pendleton, 2001).
3Yet, despite the variance of interpretation and practice, ESOPs are the longest-
established method for sharing ownership (Blasi et al, 2002). As such, employees
acquire equity shares thus permitting them a shareholding in their employing
company. For the majority of cases, employee share ownership plans consist of one of
several components of the company’s reward package. Additionally, employee ownership
may come about through an employee buy-out or through the exiting owner wanting to
pass on the business to the employees. In theory, employee ownership provides
employees with additional rights, such as the right to share in the company’s profits,
access to information about the company’s finances and operations and the right to
participate in the management of the company (Rousseau and Shperling, 2003). These
rights are intended to bring about fundamental changes in employee attitudes and
behaviour, which may be reflected in a range of company-level outcomes such as
improved productivity and financial performance (Rousseau and Shperling, 2003).
It was Sydney Webb (1912: 232) who noted that making an employee a shareholder
in the business would ‘stimulate his zeal and careful working and, as part owner of the
capital, with which he works,’ he will share responsibility in the business. Developed
further as a concept in the 1950s by the lawyer and investment banker Louis Kelso,
the ESOP was introduced in 1973 under the premise that the capitalist system would
be stronger if all workers, and not just a few stockholders, could share in owning
capital-producing assets and that tax benefits for ESOPs should be permitted and
encouraged under employee benefit law (NCEO, 2008d). Thus, the assumption made
is that sharing equity with most or all employees in a corporation is one way of
gaining employees’ involvement in profit-sharing programs (Blasi et al, 2002).
4However, the extent to which employees enjoy profit-sharing and information and
participation rights varies considerably (Ben-ner and Jones, 1995; French, 1987) and
that is considered to be a reason that the benefits from employee ownership vary
substantially.
As emphasized, there exist various modes of employee ownership. At one end of the
spectrum are workers’ co-operatives, whilst the other end is populated by executive
share-options. With the latter, participation in share ownership plans may be limited
to just a few individuals, typically senior managers, or can be open to the entire
workforce. Still, the assumption underling both profit-sharing and employee-
ownership is that the better re-distribution of the benefits of economic growth itself
stimulates greater and continued economic growth (Lowitzsch, et al 2008). Broadly,
three sets of schemes can be distinguished.
Direct: Through using one or more share plans, employees become registered as the
shareholders of a majority of the shares in their company. In order to do so,
employees may acquire shares over time, perhaps as bonuses or as part of their
remuneration. Some share schemes offer tax advantages to the company and
employees. Alternatively, the shares in the company could initially be bought by an
employee trust which later are distributed, in part or whole to individual employees.
As a result shares may be held individually or collectively. In the UK, there are three
main types of non-cash, profit sharing schemes: Approved profit sharing; Save as You
Earn (SAYE) schemes, also referred to as savings-related share- option schemes or
‘share-save’ schemes (initially established under the terms of The Finance Act 1980);
5and Company share options schemes. For these schemes to be put into operation,
clear agreement needs to be reached between employer and employees. Employees
must receive their shares in addition to their wages or salaries; the share price must be
fixed beforehand and the employees' shares must be related to profits (Morris et al,
2006). Whilst cash schemes are the simplest method of distributing profits to
employees, share options schemes, on the other hand, provide links between
individual rewards and organizational success in profit terms more on a long-term
basis (Morris et al, 2006).
Indirect: In this case, shares are held collectively on behalf of employees, normally
through an employee trust. An indirect model of employee-ownership is through a co-
operative structure (such as the Industrial and Provident Society structure) which
provides benefits to the members. The trust might hold the shares in perpetuity or
distribute them to individual employees, or a combination of the two. The trust also
can buy shares back from employees particularly those who want to sell on their
retirement. For example, a legal arrangement can be reached whereby an asset is
deposited into an escrow account under the trust of a neutral third party (escrow
agent) pending satisfaction of contractual contingencies or conditions, and who, in
turn, will deliver the asset to the party as prescribed by the contract. Placing shares
into an employee trust can have tax advantages and also provides an effective way of
raising bank finance to acquire the shares (financing an employee buyout).
With both the direct and indirect models, there exist a plethora of variations. On the
one hand, employees acquire only a small minority stake. On the other, a large
proportion of company share possibly even the entire share capital, is owned by the
6employees. As far as employee-owned enterprises (EOE) are concerned, they often
adopt profit sharing schemes, where the profits of the enterprise are shared with the
employees. To safeguard such arrangements, boards of directors are constituted,
elected directly by the employees.
The Co-operative: A corporation owned entirely by its employees (co-operative, co-
ownership, partnership) will not have its shares traded publicly on stock markets. Co-
operatives, or co-ops, emerged in response to economic and social inadequacies and
represent a legal entity owned and democratically controlled by its members. The
International Co-operative Alliance's Statement on the Co-operative Identity defines a
co-operative as ‘an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their
common economic, social and cultural needs, and aspirations, through a jointly-
owned and democratically-controlled enterprise’ (Zeuli and Cropp, 2004). Co-
operatives are businesses owned and controlled by the people who use its services or
who work in the business.
The Fenwick Weavers Society has been posited as being the first co-operative. It was
founded in 1761 to promote and maintain high standards in the craft of weaving, but
soon became involved in the bulk purchase of oatmeal for re-sale to its members
(Monklands, 2008). Shortly after, Rochdale’s mill workers set up the Rochdale
Equitable Pioneers Society whose underlying purpose was that of member self-help.
Their co-operative existed for the benefit of its members and the improvement of their
social and household condition (Monklands, 2008). They also worked out their aims
and purposes, and committed them to paper in 1844 in the form of nine specific rules,
the Rochdale Principles of Co-operation. The nine rules were: open membership;
7democratic control; distributing profits to members in proportion to their spending;
paying small amounts of interest on capital; political and religious neutrality; cash
trading; no credit; promotion of education; and quality goods and services, including
distributing a share of profits according to purchases (Monklands, 2008).
Recognising the considerable variance of employee ownership schemes, this paper
examines the nature of different forms of employee ownership and whether an
additional level of difference exists according to regional or country idiosyncrasies. A
sharp distinction is made between employee ownership and the mainstream, minority
employee share plans in large enterprises. This paper also highlights the fact that
future research needs to distinguish between the various forms of employee share
ownership if the impact of share ownership is to be more precisely understood and
calibrated.
A ’global’ Audit of ESOPs
The United States: In the U.S., an ESOP is a retirement plan in which the company
contributes its stock for the benefit of the company’s employees (SEC, 2008). U.S.
based ESOP employees never buy or hold stock directly (SEC, 2008). As such, an
ESOP is different from other non-retirement plans such as employee stock options
plans which give the employee the right to buy their company’s stock at a set price
within a certain period of time (SEC, 2008). Employee ownership in the U.S. takes
four broad forms and a number of combinations (NCEO, 2008c).
 ESOPs, stock bonus plans and profit sharing plans primarily invested in employer
stock;
8 401(k) plans primarily invested in employer stock;
 broad-based stock option plans; and
 stock-purchase plans.
ESOPs are the most popular employee-ownership scheme in the U.S according to the
NCEO (2008c). Approximately 70 per cent of ESOP owners are employed in large,
public companies (Rousseau and Shperling, 2004). In 2007, there were 9,774 ESOPs,
spread across 11.2 millions employee owners in over 11,000 companies, holding 630
billion Euros in assets (Rosen, 2008; NCEO, 2008a). The NCEO (2008b) definition
of ESOPs is broad and includes plans filed as ESOPs, stock-bonus plans and profit-
sharing plans primarily invested in company stock (Rosen, 2008). Whilst profit-
sharing and stock-bonus plans are not technically ESOPs, they are included because
there are functionally few differences, especially for the participants (Rosen, 2008).
Other employee-ownership schemes, additional to ESOPs, have some 25 million
employee owners, holding more than 1,000 billion Euros in assets (NCEO, 2008a).
Overall, in the U.S., the broad-based stock options (grants given to at least half of a
firm's workforce) have been increasing steadily, from 17 per cent in 1993 to 39 per
cent in 1999 (Rousseau and Shperling, 2004).
The United Kingdom: In the UK, employee-ownership associations (EOAs)
comprise of employee-owned and trust-owned businesses. These EOAs came about
predominately in two ways. One stream of EOAs is composed of management and
employees who benefitted from the buy-outs of public-sector firms undergoing
privatization (most in the late 1980s and early 1990s). These were predominately
highly-unionized firms, pursuing highly-leveraged buy-outs with loans from central or
9local government bodies (Pendleton, 2001). The second stream of EOAs arose from
employee-ownership conversion from the private sector where owners wanted to
divest themselves of, or exit from the business. Many of these were owner-managed
firms. Typical motivation for conversion were, and are the protection of the firm from
take-over and paternalistic sentiment concerning the welfare of employees (Pendleton,
2001). According to the EOA (2008), employee ownership is about the majority in the
company owning part of it, whether via a trust or shares, and where no outside interest
has a controlling stake.
Europe: Shared ownership plans in Europe are considerably diverse due to historical
and institutional arrangements paralleled by a huge diversity in tax treatment. Across
Continental Europe, studies of employee ownership report mixed results in terms of
employee motivation and employee and company performance (D' Art and Turner,
2004; EFESO’ 2005; Pourceau, 2003; Poutsma and de Nijs, 2003). Employee
financial participation in Europe has been more influenced by profit sharing, with
government and trade unions in support of such an arrangement (D' Art and Turner,
2004; Poutsma and de Nijs, 2003). In contrast to the UK, where there has been a trend
to introduce ESOPs in unionized enterprises (Gregg and Machin, 1988; Pendleton,
1997), in the European Union (EU), union representation and employee share
ownership co-exist and the two appear to function largely independently of each other
(Pendleton, 2005). Union involvement in the design, implementation and operation of
employee share plans in most cases is minimal. Additionally, the trend for
privatization of state-owned companies has contributed to wider employee ownership.
In Ireland, for example, nearly half a million employees were recorded as being
covered by ’profit-sharing’ schemes between 1983 and 2003 (D' Art and Turner,
2005).
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In contrast, in the early 1980s, both Scandinavia and the EU generally appeared to
favour schemes of collective, capital formation in preference to schemes of financial
participation based at the level of the individual firm (European Trade Union Institute,
1983; LO, 1980; Meidner, 1978). However, since 1987, with the development of
social partnership between EU governments and employers, this position has largely
been abandoned in favour of firm-level profit sharing or employee share-holding
schemes (D' Art and Turner, 2000; 2005). EU leaders seem uncertain as to their role
in employee-owned enterprises (Long, 1978). Although unions have a role in
conceptualizing and/or initiating the “ideal type” of employee ownership, (Freund,
1972), once ideas become a reality the union’s role tends to be superseded. The reason
is conflict of interests between labour and capital and the need for the unions to
maintain their traditional role (Long, 1978). In numerous instances where unionized
companies have converted to employee ownership, companies have remained
unionized (Long, 1978).
In Germany, 73 per cent of companies call for greater employee share ownership
whilst in Spain, legislation in support of employee-owned companies (sociedades
laborales) is being prepared (EFESO, 2008). France, on the other hand, exhibits
contradictions as the government plans to develop employee financial participation
more in SMEs. The President has so far displayed an interest in unblocking employee
savings to boost private consumption and investment in the more medium sized
French business organization. In contrast, ’The Movement of French Enterprises’
(MEDEF) organized a ‘Tour de France’ to more broadly promote employee share
ownership (EFESO, 2008). For example, France Telecom, Société Générale, Essilor
and Saint-Gobain have all adopted ESOPs (EFESO, 2008). Overall and similar to
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Germany, French law makes provision for employees of large, publicly-listed
companies to elect two types of directors to represent employees. Partially privatized
companies must reserve two or three seats, depending on board size, for directors
elected by employees by right of employment. Additionally, employee-shareholders
in any public company have the right to elect one director whenever they hold at least
3 per cent of outstanding shares. Ginglinger et al (2010) found that employee
representation on corporate boards in France seems to be at least value-neutral, with
some evidence supporting an actual increase in firm valuation and profitability when
employee-shareholders elect company directors. However, when the firm’s
employees are represented by radical, left-wing unions, the financial payout is
significantly reduced, whilst ironically corporate valuation is unaffected and firm
profitability is significantly increased due to a more structured corporate governance
regime and demanding climate of industrial relations (Ginglinger et al 2010). In Italy
employee-share ownership still seems to be absent from political debates. In
comparison to many other European countries, Italy seems to be becoming
marginalized in this area (EFESO, 2008).
Overall, some 2,500 of the largest European companies now have 8.2 million
employee owners across Europe, holding 260 billion Euros in value (EFESO, 2008).
Japan: Japanese employee share ownership plans (4.4 per cent of all firms in Japan in
1960 to 95.9 per cent in 1992) differ from their U.S. and UK counterparts (Kato and
Morishima, 2002). For a start, there are no tax incentives to employee share
participation for Japanese corporations. However, employees are encouraged to
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participate in share ownership plans by the company matching the employee’s
contribution and bearing the administrative cost. Executives are often ineligible for
membership. Shares are held in a trust, though each participant has the right to
withdraw their shares which then become privately owned and cannot be re-entered
into the fund.
Retired workers are required to exit completely. Further all employees leaving the
plan must sell their shares to the trust at current market value. The trust is required to
appoint a general director, who is a participant in the plan (but not an executive of the
firm) and who is chosen democratically by participants in the plan on a one-
participant, one-vote, basis. These trusts act as a collective voice for the employee
owners, ensuring that their views are incorporated at all levels of company
management. These trusts, or employee shareholder associations, have the capacity to
represent employees’ opinions as a whole and, thus have become a powerful voice.
Spread of Practice
As can be seen substantial differences exist between countries in the structure and
nature of owner/representative participation. The three leaders in the EU, with
employee coverage averaging over 50 per cent, are the UK, France and Poland
(Lowitzsch et al, 2008). Certain countries have decentralized systems of indirect
participation whilst others have centralized arrangements, and still others have a
combination of the two. In the UK, it appears that share ownership tends to be found
in unionized establishments through mainly single-channelled representation where
all or the most representation occurs through the union and comparable bargaining
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channels (Gregg and Machin, 1988; Pendleton, 1997). Other countries, such as
Germany, have dual systems, one through union representation in terms of collective
bargaining and a further separate representation through works councils. In many
instances, union representation and employee share ownership co-exist and function
largely independently of each other, with little union involvement in the design,
implementation and operation of employee share plans (Pendleton, 2005; 2006). The
exception to this is majority, employee-owned firms where unions are involved in
mounting buy-outs (Pendleton, 2006).
ESOPs Contextualized
As has been argued, ESOPs are contingent on each country’s laws and regulations and
philosophic predisposition. The increased usage of ESOPs in neo-liberal economies
has arisen primarily due to ‘managerial incentivization’ and favourable tax treatment
in the hands of both the issuer and the recipients (Matsunaga, 1995). After the mid-
1970s, U.S. legislation which encouraged ESOPs saw the number of ESOP companies
in the U.S. dramatically increase (Conte and Lawrence, 1992), reaching peaks in 1993
and 2005 - due to affordable tax and accounting practices. In the late 1980s, many
public companies set up ESOPs but when, accounting rules changed in a way that was
less favourable for ESOPs, many companies closed down their ESOPs and moved
their contributions of stock to 401(k) plans.
Despite the praises sung about share redistribution/participation, serious concerns
have also been voiced (Odoi, 2007). The favourable accounting and tax treatment that
facilitated the rise of ESOPs has often resulted in inflated corporate earnings, raising
the legitimate concern that many firms adopted broad-based stock option schemes to
provide an artificial boost to earnings rather than for sound business reasons
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(Kroumova and Sesil, 2005). The corporate frauds and scandals, beginning with
Enron in 2001 highlighted incidents of extraordinary executive pay and stock option
exercises, whilst employees suffered losses in their 401(k) plan. These scandals
invoked new regulations and legislation, notably that of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002.
Moreover, starting from June 2005, U.S. firms have been subject to reporting stock
options as an expense on their balance sheets (NCEO, 2005a). In March 2005, the IRS
issued a correction to the accounting regulations of 2004, thus curbing further
corporate abuse of employee incentive schemes, including ESOPs (SEC, 2008). In
anticipation of such requirement, firms started granting options to fewer employees
(NCEO, 2005b). Thus, since 2005, US firms are required to measure the ‘fair value’
of options and other equity awards at the time of the grant and then expense the value
of the award. A similar trend in the UK has paralleled the US experience, whereby the
Labour government, in 2003, scrapped tax relief on company contributions to
employee benefit trusts with the intent of minimizing tax avoidance but as a result
have made it more difficult for companies to be trust-owned (Odoi, 2007).
As can be seen, individual country laws influence whether or not employees are
allocated control rights in the companies for which they work, whether they own
shares in it or not. As highlighted in Germany, France and Japan, the law mandates
that workers be represented on corporate boards. The German co-determination policy
began in 1951 for mining, coal and steel companies, and was extended in 1976 to all
firms with more than 2000 workers. The policy requires substantial worker
representation, reserving between one-third and one-half of board seats on the
supervisory board (Aufsichgrat) of publicly listed companies for that purpose (Fauver
and Fuerst, 2006). A later law required that workers receive one-third of supervisory
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board seats in companies with between 500 and 2000 workers (Fauver and Fuerst,
2006).
Recognising the notable difference between countries holding a stakeholder
philosophy such as Germany, against those with a shareholder philosophy such as the
U.S.A, certain scholars still argue that employee participation in firm governance can
be value-enhancing, particularly when companies are confronted with economic or
financial distress (Acharya et al, 2008; Galai and Weiner, 2008). Allen et al (2007)
and Claessens and Ueda (2008) support this view presenting empirical evidence that
stakeholder-oriented firms often prosper when competing against purely shareholder-
oriented firms. In fact, Allen et al (2007) predict that firms in stakeholder-oriented
societies, such as Germany and Japan where a close relationship exists between the
enterprise and the banking system, will be more able to reduce the probability of firm
bankruptcy despite the use of debt.
Imperatives for Employee Ownership
Different reasons drive a firm's decision to adopt an employee- ownership model. The
objectives of profit sharing tend to vary according to the desire of particular
initiator(s) (D' Art and Turner, 2004). Social harmonizers, recognising the altruistic
proponents of these schemes, see them as a way to realize equity and social justice (D'
Art and Turner, 2004). Couper (2006) has argued that the underlying values of self-
help, equity, equality, democracy and solidarity are values required for finding a
common voice and sense of responsibility. It is contended that there is a ‘direct
parallel with the employees' need to feel responsibility (self-help), belonging
(community), involvement (democracy) and reward (equity) and the sustainable long-
term direction for the business, drawing on genuine employee engagement (Couper,
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2006: 7). In the wholly employee-owned firms, ‘the great strength of the partnership's
model is that employees have a real stake in the business [...] co-ownership allows the
partnership to take a long-term view, because we do not have to answer to external
shareholders who are usually seeking quick returns’ (Killen, quoted in Odoi, 2007: 1).
Managerial proponents have contended that employee ownership schemes enhance
organizational outcomes such as productivity and profitability (D' Art and Turner,
2004). Long (1978: 755) stated that ESOP’s will put each worker in the position of
improving ‘his own efforts towards costs minimization’, thus enhancing the value of
the enterprise and in turn, eliminating strikes, slowdowns, antiquated work rules and
unreasonable wage-demands. Thus, the imperative proposed is that profit sharing and
share ownership schemes represent an attempt to link pay with the performance of the
firm as a whole, with the aim of engendering a commonality of interest. Even from
an agency theory perspective, scholars have argued that agency costs can be reduced
by aligning executive, managerial and employee compensation to firm performance
(DeFusco et al., 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is the case where
particularly ’difficult to monitor’ inputs from human capital will more likely adopt
compensation plans that provide inexpensive substitutes for more formal monitoring,
such as hiring more managers or supervisors (DeFusco et al, 1990; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). The hypothesis put forward by scholars is that employee monitoring
is likely to be more severe in knowledge-based firms especially ones that are large
and where intellectual capital is the main source of customer value, or in firms that are
experiencing rapid growth (De Fusco et al, 1990).
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Similarly Rousseau and Shperling’s (2004: 563) put forward the perspective that
‘ownership is increasingly part of a larger set of practices for firms where a highly-
committed workforce is viewed as a competitive advantage’. In similar vein, Rosen et
al (2005a; 2005b) state that when employees own a stake in the company, their
attitude also sharpens as does the company’s bottom line. Morris et al (2006: 328)
found that in the UK the most common reason for employee ownership is ‘to make
employees feel that they are a part of the company and to create a feeling of
involvement and interest in the company's fortune’. The SEC (2008) suggests that
many companies use stock plans to compensate, retain and attract employees. Thus,
broad-based ownership arrangements may reflect employer efforts to retain and
motivate a collective of value-creating labour. For example, broad-based stock
options are more common where monitoring costs are high, such as where intellectual
capital drives value creation (Kroumova and Sesil, 2005).
However, and in contrast, firms may adopt broad-based options not to promote
alignment, but rather because their expensing treatment makes them appear to be an
inexpensive means of delivering compensation. This, in turn, suggests some
companies adopt ESOPs for the wrong reason(s) and this may also mean that firms
that could benefit from their use may be abandoning them unnecessarily.
Overall, the neo-liberal proponents of financial participation expect a diffusion of
share ownership to establish people's capitalism (D' Art and Turner, 2004; Kelso and
Hetter, 1967; Saunders and Harris, 1994)). Arguing from the unitary perspective,
some have proposed that there is a convergence of the roles of owner, manager and
worker, particularly in knowledge-intensive firms where expanded worker
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participation in ownership and related privileges include access to financial
information and greater freedom in decision making (Rousseau and Shperling, 2004;
Zardkoohi and Paetzold, 2004)
As share schemes have been principally used for social equity and employee
motivation reasons, they have equally been used as anti trade union measures.
Management of non-union firms, particularly in the US, use financial participation as
part of a unitarist strategy to exclude trade unions. Profit sharing, or employee share-
holding, is used as a defence or deterrent against union-organizing drives (Czarnecki,
1970; 2005; D' Art and Turner, 2004; McHugh et al, 1999). The reason for the
adoption of employee ownership is the historical shift from the centrality of rigidly
directing Taylorist ’hired hands’ (Kouzmin, 1980) to the subtlety of influencing the
thinking, values and self-managing norms and ’identities’ of ’hired heads’. Bridging
the paradigmatic Taylorist/Fordist ‘thinking versus doing’ breach remains an over-
arching legacy in Anglo-American managerial praxis, consolidated further in Neo-
liberalism (Kouzmin, 2009). The subtle re-branding of labour or employees into
’worker-owners’ or ‘employee-owners,’ further advances the institutionalization of
the ’worker-owner’ identity within the neo-liberal ideology (Kouzmin, 1980).
Employee Ownership Value
Whatever the reasoning for adopting shareholding participation, a growing body of
empirical evidence suggests that there is a weak, but positive relationship between the
broad dispersion of ESOPs and superior firm performance outcomes such as
employee productivity, firm profitability and stock performance (Klein, 1987). Blasi
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et al (2003:176), for example, have argued that a company cannot achieve desired
motivation and participation effects without financial participation, as,
“telling employees to take ownership of their jobs rings hollow if
management doesn’t offer actual financial ownership or some share in the
improved performance […]. Without wealth sharing, in some form, it feels
like the company is just trying to con you into working harder.”
Based on the assumption that owners do not need to be motivated, one stream of the
literature submits that ownership of itself creates the motivation for continuous
performance improvement (Blasi et al, 2003). An agency-theory-informed stream of
literature highlights the possible economic rewards as root causes of the beneficial
motivational effect (BCI Group, 2002; Hallock and Salazar, 2003; Ittner et al, 2002;
Sesil et al, 2002). Others argue that if an ESOP is combined with some of the basic
rights of ownership, such as information about the company and participation in
decision-making, that of itself will also have a positive impact on work attitude and
behaviour (Gudmundson et al, 2003; Rosen and Carberry, 2002; Stack and
Burlingham, 2002). Thus, there appears to be a performance premium associated with
sharing stock options with the broader set of employees, especially in ’knowledge’
intensive firms where better company performance is associated with the use of
employee ownership (Pendleton, 2001; Sesil et al, 2003). Pendleton (2001) supports
this case purporting that ESOP participation is more widespread within the financial
sector due to employees higher knowledge of the characteristics of the plans and more
generally in sectors with a higher concentration of non-manual employees who may be
more familiar with the use and concept of stock savings.
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Some (Bonin et al, 1993; Craig and Penavel, 1992; Park et al, 2004) have argued that,
while employee ownership is associated with higher productivity, the greater survival
rate of these companies is not explained by greater employment stability, but rather by
higher productivity, financial strength or compensation flexibility. Bonin et al (1993)
have argued that the switch from focusing on profit maximizing to other optimizing
criteria ensures workers-owners’ interest in the firm's decision-making process and in
their sharing of the surplus benefits. Thus, employee ownership companies may
provide greater employment security in an effort to build a more co-operative culture,
which can increase employee commitment, training and willingness to make
adjustments when economic difficulties occur (Melgarejo et al, 2007; Park et al,
2004). It should be noted however, that the majority of the empirical studies
examining ESOPs are carried out within the U.S. shareholder value market (Blasi et
al, 2003), with only a few notable studies carried out in the European Union (EU)
(Pendleton , 2001).
Overall, employee share plans or ‘partnership capitalism’ is found to increase the
productivity level by about 4 per centage points, compared to firms that do not adopt
such practice (Blasi et al, 2002). Total shareholder returns increase by about two per
centage points relative to other firms, whilst profit levels go up by about 14 per cent
(Blasi et al, 2002). Although certain studies have produced inconclusive results,
overall research results have shown that employee ownership has a modest positive
impact on workplace variables (Blasi et al., 1996; Huselid, 1995; Klein, 1987;
Pendleton et al, 1998; Pfeffer, 1995; ). Certainly one consistent theme has been the
emphasis on good human resource practice and the impact of that on firm
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performance and competitive advantage (Huselid, 1995; Morris et al, 2006; Pfeffer,
1995).
What we Know (or do not Know) about ESOPs
As shown attention has focused on exploring the relationship between profit sharing
and organizational performance, controlling for possible exogenous and endogenous
effects including firm size, market location, product portfoliom, date of establishment
and individual country effects (D' Art and Turner, 2004). Firm performance has been
measured and compared through such components as pre-adoption and post–adoption
of ESOPs, as well as between ESOP and non-ESOP firms. In addition to financial
performance, profit sharing impact on the level of productivity, service quality,
product to market time and rate of innovation, have also been examined (D' Art and
Turner, 2004). Various types of employee ownership in Britain, Ireland, Japan,
Scandinavia, Spain and the former Eastern bloc have also been studied (D’ Art and
Turner, 2004; Jones and Kato, 1995; Melgarejo et al, 2007; Morris et al, 2006;
Pendleton et al, 1998; Pendleton, 2001; Poole, 1988). Further, the presence or the
absence of staff associations (unions) and the impact of that on share ownership
adoption have also equally been given attention (Morris et al, 2006; Poole, 1989).
Some scholars (Gudmundson et al, 2003; Rosen and Carberry, 2002; Stack and
Burlingham, 2002) have found a link between employee share ownership, financial
participation and involvement in decision making, resulting a ‘culture of ownership’,
on the one hand, and innovation on the other, due to ‘initiation and implementation of
innovation being significantly enhanced when employees are empowered to take
action’ (Gudmundson et al, 2003: 14). Certain scholars contend that firms with
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employee share ownership are able to tap into human capital by operating ‘policies
that draw more fully on worker skills and innovation’ (Kruse et al, 2003: 6).
Research has also shown that companies with employee share ownership (50 per cent
or more), or with significant levels of employee financial participation, have higher
productivity and financial performance, greater innovation, higher levels of customer
loyalty, lower staff turnover, increased shareholder returns, productivity and financial
performance (Conyon and Freeman, 2001; Freeman et al, 2004; Kato and Morishima,
2002; Lamberg et al, 1993; Michie et al, 2002).
An overall literature review (Conte and Svejnar, 1990; Doucouliagos, 1995; Kruse
and Blasi, 1997; Kruse et al, 2007; Pérotin and Robinson, 2003), suggests that
employee share ownership has limited but positive effects on organizational
performance and particular productivity, albeit these outcomes are often small and/or
statistically insignificant. Studies based on western-market economies suggest that
employee share-ownership and profit-sharing have had positive effects on workers
incentives and productivity (Blinder, 1990). In similar vein, studies from new EU
entrants, such as the Baltic countries, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, indicate that
post-privatization performance of employee-owned firms have been similar to that of
other types of firms (Uvalić and Vaughan-Whitehead, 1997). The Doucouliagos
(1995) study suggests that the positive effects tend to be more prominent and
statistically significant amongst firms with majority employee ownership rather than
amongst firms with employee share plans, (Conte and Svejnar, 1990). Although most
share-ownership plans do not appear to fundamentally transform the employment
relationship, evidence has emerged which highlights the minimizing of the ‘free-rider’
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syndrome and the redirection of alignment concerns common to large and listed
enterprises (Sengupta, 2008).
One theme runs through many of the studies and that is the lack of transformation of
the firm through employee relationship and that may be due to the fact that in the
majority of cases ‘shareholders do not own the corporation, which is an autonomous
legal person’ (Heracleous and Lan, 2010: 24). Thus, when company ‘directors go
against shareholder wishes, even when a loss in value is documented, courts tend to
side with directors the vast majority of the time’ and, as such, render shareholders
impotent (Heracleous and Lan, 2010: 24). Although share-ownership schemes transfer
equity to employees, in many cases this is proportionally small and so little
expectation is created on the part of those employees involved in transforming the
way the company is run. However, in companies with a substantial employee
ownership (50 per cent or more), employee expectations have been captured as
different (Pendleton et al, 1998). Some have argued that the effects of employee
ownership are greater or are achieved only when there is employee participation in
decision-making (Pendleton et al. 1998; Addison and Belfield, 2001). In employee-
owned firms, employee participation appears requisite for achieving a full sense of
ownership; namely the right to determine how an asset is used and disposed off
(Pendleton et al. 1998; Addison and Belfield, 2001; Rosen et al, 2005; Kaarsemaker
and Poutsma, 2006).
Yet, despite findings for and against, the majority of studies of ESOPs favourably
conclude that the advantages of employee involvement and/or ownership of the
enterprise outweigh the disadvantages. However, the voice of concern (Kaarsemaker
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and Poutsma, 2006) relates to the simplicity of the studies and inadequacy of research
methodology. Kaarsemaker, and Poutsma (2006) especially highlight to,
 an inadequate probing of the conditions supporting positive employee ownership
outcomes. Are identified positive effects due to ownership structure or other
factors such as leadership?
 an inadequate study of the experiences/concerns of the individual in terms of
happiness, stress, adequacy of earnings or sufficiency of pensions;
 an inadequate scrutiny of the relationship between improved productivity and
individual well being, despite the volume of conclusions linking positive
outcomes for the company and the employee; and
 an undue focus on EO enterprises in Anglo-Saxon nations rather than broader
international comparisons especially where financial participation is supported by
task incentives such as in Austrian, Germany, Ireland, France, etc.
Certainly studies of multi-national corporations (MNC’s), strongly suggests that the
positive outcomes attributed to ESOPs enterprises could be more the result of
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008),
 capable leadership;
 well-trained and developed management, both strategically and operationally
capable despite pressures for meeting short-term targets;
 well-thought through human resource management (HRM) policies promoting
talent management, collaborative/team ways of working, work/life balance,
coaching and counselling;
 responsible and disciplined governance; and
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 a positive orientation to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability
adoption.
Where to for ESOPS?
The assumptions underlying employee ownership research point to the fact that
employee ownership modifies the relationship between workers and their work
organization which, in turn, has implications for the quality of working life of
employees, for their performance and the performance of the organisation
(Tannenbaum, 1983). Some argue that such effects occur through companies designed
to be more egalitarian, participative and supportive, appealing to a sense of
identification with, and contributing to, the success of the enterprise (Tannenbaum,
1983). However, other studies have shown modest outcomes of worker participation
as they had relatively little influence compared with that of the enterprise managers
(Obardovic, 1970). Workers who were members of the councils were only slightly
more satisfied with their jobs than workers who were not council members
(Obradovic, 1970).
On a broader scale, one powerful call is for employee ownership studies to be pursued
on a cross-cultural basis. A number of researchers (Blasi, 1988; Hallock and Salazar,
2003; Klein and Hall, 1988) propose that future research should avoid the
manipulation of large, readily-available data sets which have dominated previous
studies and should concentrate more on detailed studies of individual firms that have
adopted ESOPs. Some critics (Odoi, 2007) argue that although there is a range of
employee-ownership business models, there is an overall unawareness, not only
amongst employees but also amongst accountants and lawyers, about how these
26
models work and how co-owned schemes have been or are structured (Kouzmin,
1993).
The alternative voice is that the study of employee-ownership models is hampered not
so much by empirical concerns as much as by paradigmatic and ideological
constraints, especially in relation to the on-going presence of managerial prerogatives
and increasing disparities in remuneration in Neo-liberal economies (Kakabadse, et al
2004). Then there is the question of 20th Century European history. Commissar,
entrepreneur, manager and bureaucrat constitute one social cleavage. They cohere and
articulate similar interests by virtue of the common problems and experiences to
which their position exposes them: the logic of authority relations within formal
organizations (Kouzmin, 1980). One has yet to see a ‘distributive,’ rather than a
‘production,’ socialism (Kouzmin and Korac-Kakabadse, 1997), the latter having led
to a universal embrace of a highly-exploitative, technical division of labour.
Within the grip of ‘means’ over ‘ends’, Eastern Europe did struggle to find some
expression of labour concerns within ‘Fordist’ industrialism. Despite the challenges,
how can one seriously engage with the question of employee ownership whilst
ignoring such rich veins of experience from Eastern Europe? Even the Chinese have
entered into the fray (li et al, 2005).
The case for cross-cultural, bottom up research is simply overwhelming. Moreover,
there is a need for better understanding how employee-ownership firms perform in
relation to the non-employee ownership firms in a globally-depressed market, and,
more importantly, whether employee-ownership schemes will continue to survive in a
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constantly changing labor market? Moreover, the literature is predominately silent on
whether:
 shareholding structure, of itself, determines higher-quality performance at the
company, team and individual level or not;
 quality management, supportive organization culture and a positive orientation
towards CSR and sustainability result as much from capable leadership and
forward thinking HRM policies and practices, rather than just financial and legal
structures,
 security of employment, particularly under global financial crisis conditions, may
or may not have the beneficial effects discussed above,
 the tension between employees and management, and between parts of the
organization is a phenomenon of most medium to large-sized organizations,
irrespective of ownership structure. The leadership capability of top management
to minimize misalignment effects on company performance emerges as a critical
factor, possibly less so than ownership structures.
Certainly future study of the effects and benefits of employee participation/employee
ownership schemes can no longer remain within the paradigm of, is it good to have or
not? The need is to examine ESOP schemes as one alternative available to the firm in
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